The objective of this work is to explore two different types of anti-terrorist policies and examine their reaction to distinct types of terrorists' motivation.
language | ![]() | english |
wordcount | ![]() | 16842 (cca 48 pages) |
contextual quality | ![]() | N/A |
language level | ![]() | N/A |
price | ![]() | free |
sources | ![]() | 54 |
Introduction 1
1 Economic motivation for investigating terrorism and brief history of terrorism 3
1.1 Economic areas influenced by terrorism 3
1.2 Basic statistics 5
1.2.1 Methods of empirical research 6
1.2.2 Look at the data 6
1.3 Brief history and trends 8
2 Classification of key players and our assumptions 11
2.1 Rationality 11
2.2 Definition of key players 12
2.2.1 Government 12
2.2.2 Terrorists 13
2.3 Terrorists\' utility functions 15
2.3.1 Parameters of utility function 15
2.3.2 Become terrorist or remain peaceful 17
2.3.3 Expected utility 20
2.3.4 Costs and Benefits of Terrorism 21
3 Anti-Terrorism Policies 23
3.1 Deterrence 23
3.2 \"Carrot policy\" 27
3.2.1 Education 29
3.2.2 Positive sanctions 31
3.2.3 Political and economic decentralization 34
3.2.4 Political integration 36
3.3 Income Effect and Substitution Effect 36
4 Static game theory models 38
4.1 Interaction between government and terrorists 38
4.2 Join effect of deterrence and positive incentives 40
4.2.1 Terrorists with non-nihilist preferences 41
4.2.2 Terrorists with nihilist preferences 44
Conclusion 47
APPENDIX 1 - Transnational Terrorism: Events 1968 - 2000
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I guess the presentation is more or less reflective of his previous writings. But nice discussion though.